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The ‘truth’ about idiocy: revisiting files of children in the 
Dutch ‘School for Idiots’ in the nineteenth century
Annemieke van Drenth
clinical child and adolescent studies, Leiden university, Leiden, the netherlands
ABSTRACT
In 1855 the Revd C. E. Van Koetsveld established his ‘School for Idiots’ 
in The Hague. Within two years, he had also opened a boarding facility 
that accommodated many of his pupils. Legal regulations demanded 
authorisation for a child to be placed in this asylum. This procedure 
included a questionnaire on the condition of the child. The paper 
discusses the analysis of data included in the files of 187 children 
admitted to Van Koetsveld’s institution between 1857 and 1873. In 
an earlier examination of these data, the author was intrigued about 
what could be inferred from these data. In this paper the same 
question is addressed from a new angle by applying the theoretical 
and methodological perspective of ‘praxeography’. This approach 
reveals the logic behind the process of inscribing characteristics on 
vulnerable children. Moreover, the analysis shows how children’s 
inner worlds were opened up for further examination and social 
intervention.
Introduction
The first pupil admitted to the Dutch ‘School for Idiots’, established in The Hague in 1855 
by the Reverend Cornelis E. Van Koetsveld, was the 13-year-old Alida. She had been found 
by the clergyman in a miserable condition, alone at home, in what was more a hovel than 
a house. She had been seated on the floor, with ‘her uncombed hair hanging over a fire-
pot to keep herself warm’.1 Since she lacked proper parental care and had been dismissed 
from the local needlework classes because she was said to be ‘mad’, her chances of further 
educational success seemed limited. According to Van Koetsveld, it required considerable 
courage to take on the challenge of educating a girl of Alida’s age who displayed physical 
signs of problems: ‘swollen glands, a flat forehead, and a projecting lower lip’. Nevertheless, 
Van Koetsveld decided to take the girl into care, aiming to provide her with what he referred 
to as a ‘cure by education’. Inspired by the approach of ‘training the senses’ advocated by his 
French predecessor Edouard Séguin, Van Koetsveld focused his treatment on awakening 
1the story is included in the second annual report of the institution (1859): Tweede Jaarverslag van het Geneeskundig 
Gesticht en de daaraan verbonden Dagschool voor Minderjarige Idioten te ’s Gravenhage over het jaar 1859, 14–15. 
these and other sources mentioned in following references are in the Municipal archive of the Hague, no. 34. archives of 
the Medical institution for under-aged idiots, 1855–1920.
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the mental capacities he believed to still remain within the child’s mind. Practices of men-
tal training and education of this kind led to vulnerable children such as Alida becoming 
more visible and more explicitly designated as ‘idiots’. Though their basic condition was 
assumed to be caused by various factors, their identity was primarily defined in terms of 
‘insensibility to normal education’. The ultimate goal of the treatment was for these children 
to be integrated into regular education, which would guide them on their way to adulthood.
 In his analysis of how the figure of ‘the idiot child’ became central in the nineteenth- 
century process of ‘the psychiatrization of the child’, Michel Foucault explained the double- 
edged aspect of mental illness and retardation by highlighting the temporality introduced 
by the concept of ‘development’.2 Nineteenth-century doctors and educationists started to 
consider ‘the idiot as a particular sort of child, not someone who is ill’. According to Foucault, 
they started to consider that ‘the idiot is someone more or less sunk within a childhood that 
is normal childhood itself ’.3 In this way the introduction of a temporal dimension enabled 
a shift to take place from madness to abnormality. The recognition of possible stagnation 
in the development of a child’s psyche, which could be overcome by care and guidance, at 
the same time implied the pedagogisation of all children, including those who lacked ‘the 
will’ to develop.
Research into the history of the emergence of the field of child psychiatry has shown that 
in the 1850s discussion about childhood and mental disturbances was only in its infancy.4 In 
fact the outlines of the whole concept of ‘the pathological child’ were still vague. Gradually, 
however, the notion of ‘the idiot’ would develop into a sort of ‘repoussoir figure’: showing 
this specific type of child in detail by putting it in the foreground served to guide the view 
into the wider scenery of childhood. Central in this emerging notion of childhood was the 
journey every child was thought to make in order to step into the world of ‘normality’, with 
adulthood as the final destination.5 According to Foucault the mid-nineteenth-century 
doctors and educationists argued that ‘therapy for idiocy will be pedagogy itself ’. This would 
be ‘a more radical pedagogy which will search further, which will go back deeper into the 
archaic roots of all this, but a pedagogy all the same’.6 This ‘will to know’,7 the productive 
power of opening the child’s psyche, could reveal the ‘true’ child, hiding underneath layers 
of instinct which hindered the development of normal faculties and capacities.8 By this 
process new knowledge about the inner world of the child, the ‘truth of the individual 
2Michel foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973–1974, ed. J. Lagrange (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 208.
3ibid. 209.
4sally shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, Science, and Medicine, 1840–1900 (oxford/
new york: oxford university Press, 2010), 13–41.
5annemieke van drenth and Kevin Myers, ‘normalising childhood: Policies and interventions concerning special children in 
the united states and Europe’, Paedagogica Historica 47 (2011): 719–728; andré turmel, Historical Sociology of Childhood: 
Developmental Thinking, Categorization and Graphic Visualization (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2008).
6foucault, Psychiatric Power, 210.
7this ‘will to know’ was a basic aspect of foucault’s ‘archeological’ approach in studying madness and sexuality. La volonté 
de savoir was the subtitle of his famous Histoire de la sexualité (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), in which he advocated research 
into the discursive practices constituting sex that would answer questions such as ‘Why has sexuality been so widely 
discussed, and what has been said about it? What were the effects of power generated by what was said? What are the 
links between these discourses, these effects of power, and the pleasures that were invested by them? What knowledge 
(savoir) was formed as a result of this linkage?’ see the English translation, The History of Sexuality, Vol. i: An Introduction 
(new york: Vintage Books, 1980), 11.
8foucault, Psychiatric Power, 215.
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himself ’ as Foucault once put it,9 was produced within the context of changing relations 
between children, parents, doctors and teachers.10
Important in the Foucauldian perspective is the shift from an epistemological point of 
view, where the interest lies in examining the preconditions for acquiring ‘true’ knowledge, 
to an ‘archeological’ approach, in which truth is established in specific practices and inter-
ventions.11 Or, as Foucault formulated it in his introduction to the English translation of 
Georges Canguilhem’s On the Normal and the Pathological: ‘Error is not eliminated by the 
muffled force of a truth which gradually emerges from the shadow but by the formation of 
a new way of “speaking true”.’12 Following Canguilhem in his emphasis on the practices and 
dialogues between doctors and patients in which ‘the pathological and the normal’ come 
into existence, Foucault underlines the importance of discontinuities in what he refers to 
as ‘truthful discourses’. Discontinuity is constituted by ‘alterings, reshapings, elucidations 
of new foundations, changes in scale, the transition to a new kind of objects’.13 According 
to Foucault, Canguilhem’s contribution to the denial of a ‘hidden, ordered progression’ – in 
which the false is corrected and the truth discovered – is his observation that sciences as 
truthful discourses ‘are made at each instant in terms of a certain norm’.14 Instead of the 
search for a new, epistemologically more ‘true’ knowledge, Foucault, following Canguilhem, 
emphasises the centrality of practices and interventions in all their local and historical 
discontinuities.
Van Koetsveld’s school for children with idiocy was an example of such an intervention, 
in this case concerning children who became seen as ‘special’. They were sorted out as 
objects for a medico-pedagogical treatment that stimulated the production of knowledge 
about their ‘inner world’. Thus norms were established according to which their anomalies 
were recognised as abnormality in terms of ‘idiocy’. In this article the central focus lies on 
the practices that guided this ‘will to know’, which took material form in the techniques 
and routines necessary to accommodate children in a custodial facility. By switching from 
an epistemological to an archaeological perspective, I will demonstrate how sources I have 
studied before can be re-read in the light of a different theoretical context.
The asylum was initiated two years after the opening of the ‘School for Idiots’, when a 
relocation to a new building enabled the boarding of children who could not remain with 
their parents.15 Officially, Van Koetsveld and the other members of the Board of the school 
considered the children to be in need of physical, intellectual and moral education. The 
fundamental observation underlying this statement was that their mental capacities were 
9Michel foucault, ‘afterword: “the subject of Power”’, in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. With 
an Afterword by Michel Foucault, ed. Hubert L. dreyfusband and Paul rabinow (chicago: chicago university Press, 1982), 
208–26.
10foucault, Psychiatric Power, 216–19.
11Michel foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge (London: tavistock , 1972).
12Georges canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological (dordrecht/Holland etc.: d. reidel Publishing, 1978); translation 
from orig. respectively 1943 and 1963–1966, with an introduction by Michel foucault. Quoted at p. xiv.
13ibid., xiv.
14ibid., xv.
15see for the history of the school theo Jak, Armen van geest. Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse 
zwakzinnigenzorg (amsterdam: Pedagogisch adviesbureau, 1988); annemieke van drenth, ‘Van Koetsveld and his “school 
for idiots” in the Hague (1855–1920): Gender and the History of special Education in the netherlands’, History of Education 
34 (2005): 151–169.
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‘poorly or wrongly developed’.16 The children’s lack of intellectual faculties meant that they 
were believed to be unable to attend school in regular educational settings. In his mon-
ograph Idiotism and the School for Idiots (1856), Van Koetsveld elaborated his sensorial 
approach towards the children in his care.17 Since this was a medico-pedagogical institution, 
the children were to receive treatment based on a combination of education and medical 
observation. Thus they were to be provided with intellectual and emotional challenges as 
well as medical surveillance and daily care. Clearly Van Koetsveld and the other members 
of the board of the School for Idiots had to negotiate their strategy with relevant others, 
in particular the doctors of the Inspectorate of the Insane, who were the legal authorities 
responsible for the care and treatment of individuals in mental health institutions.
Inspired by a strong religious humanitarianism, the Reverend Van Koetsveld considered 
it his pastoral duty to develop an institution that brought together care, cure and education 
for vulnerable children such as Alida. In earlier publications I have analysed his work in the 
context of the theoretical concept of ‘caring power’.18 An important characteristic of this type 
of power is the intention to assure both the well-being of individuals, in this case children 
with mental deficiencies, and the welfare of society as a whole. The medico-pedagogical 
approach that Van Koetsveld developed in his School for Idiots aimed at the care and cure 
of both bodies and souls of vulnerable children designated as ‘idiots’. The strategy was not 
only to examine the physical well-being of every child, but also to open the child’s inner 
world in search of his or her own ‘will’. Consequently, the educational élan underlying the 
treatment of these children reflected a strong belief in the potential for development within 
every single child. At the same time, the notion of ‘childhood’ was invoked as a phase of 
gradual physical and mental development. The notion presupposed something like ‘normal 
child development’ and enhanced the idea of a mental standard of ‘normal’ psychological 
functioning that was related to the child’s age.
As Shuttleworth notes in The Mind of the Child, ‘The concept of a child, with reference 
to age, was decidedly elastic in the nineteenth century, shifting markedly according to 
context.’19 This prompts the question of what we can actually find out about children such 
as Alida who were admitted to the School for Idiots in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and what types of sources we can draw on for this knowledge. Often when we go 
back more than a century it can be hard to find sources that inform us about individuals’ 
personal experiences. Ego-documents or other statements of individuality are scarce at the 
best of times. And when it comes to children, and especially children with mental defi-
ciencies, descriptions of how they themselves experienced their daily realities are virtually 
non-existent. This also applies to the children accommodated in Van Koetsveld’s School 
for Idiots. We have to rely on the more or less official data that have survived. In this case 
we can draw on documents concerning the legal admission of children to the asylum of 
the first Dutch school for special education.
16annemieke van drenth, Reglement van de Idiotenschool te ‘s Gravenhage, opgericht 14 mei 1855, ’s Gravenhage, n.d, 5.
17c.E. Van Koetsveld, Het idiotisme en de idioten-school. Eene eerste proeve op een nieuw veld van geneeskundige opvoed-
ing en christelijke philantropie (schoonhoven: Van nooten, 1856).
18van drenth, ‘Van Koetsveld and his “school for idiots”’; annemieke van drenth, ‘caring Power and disabled children. the rise 
of the Educational Élan in the united states and Europe, in Particular in Belgium and the netherlands’, in Disability and the 
Politics of Education. An International Reader, ed. susan L. Gabel and scott danforth (new york: Peter Lang, 2008), 433–449.
19shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child, 10. see also carolyn steedman, Strange Dislocations. Childhood and the Idea of 
Human Interiority, 1780–1930 (London: Virago, 1995).
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In 2007 I published a first article on my research into the files of 187 girls and boys 
who were placed in Van Koetsveld’s institution during the period 1857 to 1873.20 The aim 
of the present article is to reconsider my earlier analysis of these files from another, more 
specific theoretical and methodological perspective, which underlines the importance of 
practices and procedures.21 Later I will explain the ‘praxeographic’ approach that I used to 
reframe the data.22 These data resulted from 187 files that are part of a larger set of case-
files, available in the Municipal Archive of The Hague. They relate to over 350 children 
who were accommodated in the asylum for some time during the period 1857–1886. In 
my earlier research I was already intrigued by the question of what we could deduce from 
these data, but my perspective then was still strongly framed by the empirical question of 
what was represented in and through these data. Now I wish to reconsider the data from a 
new methodological point of view. In my new approach the knowledge to be found is not 
so much referential, but rather procedural. It does not presuppose straightforward evidence 
that can just be grasped in the data. Rather, the new approach questions the procedures that 
shaped new ways of being and knowing, and thereby new power relations. My aim in the 
present article is to re-examine the ‘truth about idiocy’ as the logic of procedures used to 
approach vulnerable children in order to specify their need for care and education. Thereby, 
the emphasis in this new analysis is on how these children were perceived as deviating from 
the standard of a ‘normal’ child. Or, differently formulated: What logic guided the early 
form of diagnosis of children as ‘idiots’ and how did this ‘truth about idiocy’ relate to the 
intervention in children’s development?
In answering this question I follow two lines of argument, which ultimately converge 
in a reassessment of my previous data analysis. First I will briefly outline the situation 
regarding the custody, care and cure of children with mental problems in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, focusing on the Netherlands. This will reveal the historical modus 
of legal regulations concerning ‘the insane’, which formed the historical context in which 
Van Koetsveld came to situate his medico-pedagogical intervention. Though the minister’s 
main objective was clearly education, he could not ignore the existing legal procedures for 
the admission of children to the asylum of the school, as set out in the Dutch Insanity Act 
of 1841. This act stipulated that children could only be accommodated in institutions by a 
court order known as a rechterlijke machtiging (judicial decision). Furthermore, the school 
and the asylum fell under the jurisdiction of the Inspectorate of the Insane. It was in this 
context that the texts which are central in my research were produced: the aim of compiling 
the files was to assess children’s bodies and minds to decide on their identity as inhabitants 
of an institution for the insane.
In a second line of argument, I propose a praxeographic approach. The central aspect 
is the analysis of data by which ‘idiocy’ was shaped as a specific way of being, which also 
formed the basis for the inclusion of such children in an asylum like Van Koetsveld’s. The 
20annemieke van drenth, ‘Mental Boundaries and Medico-Pedagogical selection: Girls and Boys in the dutch “school for 
idiots”, the Hague 1857–1873’, Paedagogica Historica 43 (2007): 99–117.
21for research underlining the importance of practices, procedures and methods, see turmel, A Historical Sociology of 
Childhood; Kevin Myers, ‘Marking time: some Methodological and Historical Perspectives on the “crisis of childhood”’, 
Research Papers in Education 27 (2012): 409–22; European Early Childhood Education Research Journal 20 (2012), 
special issue: ‘Praxeological research in Early childhood: a contribution to a social science of the social’.
22the perspective is inspired by annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practices (durham, nc and London: 
duke university Press, 2002) and Geertje Mak, Doubting Sex: Inscriptions, Bodies and Selves in Nineteenth-century 
Hermaphrodite Case Histories (Manchester and new york: Manchester university Press, 2012). i follow Mak in her spelling 
of ‘praxeography’, though Mol coined the term as ‘praxiography’ in her earlier study.
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praxeographic approach makes this analysis possible by historicising the ways in which a 
phenomenon such as ‘idiocy’ was verbalised and registered through routines and techniques 
aimed at finding out what was so specific in these children. In the final part of this article I 
will reconsider my earlier analysis of the data. This reassessment will guide my conclusion 
concerning the way in which ‘truth about idiocy’ allowed nineteenth-century interventions 
concerning vulnerable children.
Custody, care and cure
In The Rise of Caring Power Francisca de Haan and I underlined the importance of the wave 
of humanitarianism which increasingly came to influence social and political relations in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.23 Humanitarian sensibility, and humanitarian 
narratives reflecting this sensibility, manifested themselves in various shapes and forms. 
Human beings, previously often neglected or loathed, were now an object of attention. They 
were increasingly visualised as individuals in their own right. The public world saw the 
emergence of humanitarianism that explored the inner world of individuals in an attempt 
to probe their feelings and sufferings, both mental and physical.24 One specific aspect of 
this, highlighted by Dora Weiner, was the new humanitarian approach to handling individ-
uals with mental problems.25 The political doctrine of the ‘rights of man’, which advocated 
a more democratic culture for all, was increasingly also taken to include individuals with 
deficiencies and problems, making them more visible and recognising their need for proper 
treatment, care and education.
Traditionally the central figure in asylums for the insane had been the alienist, often more 
like a superintendent and a custodian than a doctor. Gradually, however, medical doctors 
received more authority in these institutions, paving the way for what we now know as the 
domain of psychiatry.26 In this way, the initial custodial approach was transformed into a 
new regime for handling individuals with mental problems. The mix of care and cure that 
typified this regime was often referred to as ‘moral treatment’. The fundamental character-
istic of this new approach lay in a medico-pedagogical perspective on the human mind and 
the recognition of something like ‘development’, which shaped the lives of every individual 
from childhood onwards. Consequently, the bodies as well as the minds of anomalous 
individuals were seen in a new light, in which their constitution was viewed as the result 
of illness or stagnated development. Nuancing Foucault’s thesis of ‘the great confinement’ 
of the insane during the nineteenth century, Roy Porter stresses that the inclusion of indi-
viduals with problems in custodial institutions was determined by a process of ‘complex 
bargaining between families, communities, local officials, magistrates, and the superinten-
dents themselves’.27 This process was modified in specific social and political contexts. In 
the Netherlands the religious structure known as ‘pillarisation’ meant that, according to 
23annemieke van drenth and francisca de Haan, The Rise of Caring Power. Elizabeth Fry and Josephine Butler in Britain 
and the Netherlands (amsterdam: amsterdam university Press, 1999), 24–29 and 33–36.
24thomas Haskell, ‘capitalism and the origins of the Humanitarian sensibility’, American Historical Review 90 (1985): 339–61 
and 547–66; thomas W. Laqueur (1989) ‘Bodies, details, and the Humanitarian narrative’, in The New Cultural History, ed. 
Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: university of california Press, 1989), 176–204.
25dora B. Weiner, ‘the Madman in the Light of reason’, chapter 6; ‘Philippe Pinel in the twenty-first century’, chapter 7, in 
History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology , ed. Edwin r. Wallace and John Gach (new york: springer, 2008), 255–312.
26Michel foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (new york: Vintage Books, 1973).
27roy Porter, Madness: A Brief History (oxford and new york: oxford university Press, 2002), 99.
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Porter, ‘as late as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, separate Calvinist and Catholic 
asylums were being set up’.28 In relation to the care of the ‘feeble-minded’, too, the specific 
religious social structure of the Netherlands slowed the pace of the development of such 
institutions.29
The institution founded by Van Koetsveld was an early example of a Protestant initiative 
that combined care and cure in treating children with developmental problems. The sub-
title of Van Koetsveld’s (1856) monograph on Idiotism and the School for Idiots designated 
the institution as A First Attempt into the New Field of Medical Education and Christian 
Philanthropy. Legally, the Inspectorate of the Insane was responsible for inspecting the 
asylum and controlling conditions there. Moreover, the Insanity Act of 1841 demanded that 
the inclusion of a pupil in custodial care was authorised by a judge. Thus Van Koetsveld 
and his school board were forced to accept this form of authorisation, despite the fact that 
their main goal was education rather than cure. The legal procedures implied a form of 
medico-pedagogical selection of children. The actual procedure of decision-making by a 
judge was based on the advice of a local figure of authority, often a local physician who had 
assessed the pupil’s condition.30 This advice was structured through a standard questionnaire 
regarding the condition of the individual in question. Officially, children were nominated 
for placement in the institution by their legal representatives, in most cases the parents. 
In accordance with the Insanity Act of 1841, the decision regarding placement had to be 
reconfirmed from time to time. The information provided by the first questionnaire had 
to be updated, and this task was performed by the asylum doctor and the head teacher of 
the School for Idiots. In this way they also played an important role in the process of legal 
authorisation of the child’s inclusion in what was still considered a facility for assuring 
mental health.31
The data resulting from the questionnaires guided the judge who had to decide on the 
‘truth’ of designating the child ‘an idiot’ and consequently allowing him or her to be con-
fined in custodial care. Though Van Koetsveld and the other members of the board of the 
School for Idiots opposed the process of medico-pedagogical selection, the Inspectorate of 
the Insane remained adamant that ‘the idiot has the same right as every other individual’ 
not to be deprived of his or her liberty without legal intervention.32 The questionnaire used 
in the procedure addressed three central issues: indications concerning the child’s mental 
state and cognitive development, the child’s medical condition and any hereditary defects 
that could be related to that condition, and last but not least the child’s general attitude and 
social behaviour.33
28ibid., 92.
29ido Weijers and Evelien tonkens, ‘christianization of the soul: religious traditions in the care of People with Learning 
disabilities in the netherlands in the nineteenth century’, Social History of Medicine 12 (1999): 351–69; ido Weijers, 
‘Educational initiatives in Mental retardation in nineteenth-century Holland’, History of Education Quarterly 40 (2000): 
460–76.
30for the dutch context of early psychiatry, see Harry oosterhuis and Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, Verward van geest en ander 
ongerief. Psychiatrie en geestelijke gezondheidszorg in Nederland (1870–2005) (Houten: Bohn stafleu van Loghum, 
2008); Joost Vijzelaar and timo Bolt, J.L.C. Schroeder van der Kolk en het ontstaan van de psychiatrie in Nederland 
(amsterdam: Boom, 2012).
31van drenth, ‘Mental Boundaries and Medico-Pedagogical selection’, 107–108.
32ibid., 108.
33ibid., 109.
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A praxeographic approach
Today these texts are the main source that can tell us something about the children in Van 
Koetsveld’s school and asylum. But how should we analyse these data? What can we find 
out from such questionnaires that include brief information about the children, provided 
mostly by a local doctor, on the basis of what parents and sometimes teachers have said 
about them? Or, more importantly, in what sort of logic was this specific information 
generated? At the time, the procedure of establishing an ‘idiotic child’ was embedded in a 
double-edged conceptualisation, for ‘idiocy’ was considered a disorder with a physical as 
well as a psychic component. To complicate matters still further, as Patrick McDonagh has 
stressed in his cultural history of idiocy, though it ‘appears a state of being when applied to 
an individual’, idiocy is also ‘a reification: an idea given flesh and embodied by (or imposed 
upon) specific individuals’.34 Therefore, the concept can also take on a ‘metonymic state’: 
‘when it is a diagnostic label pasted onto a human, that human becomes defined by his or 
her capacity to embody the part of human nature called “idiocy”, which is also that part of 
our human being receiving the invective’.35 Consequently, establishing a notion of ‘idiocy’ 
not only put the identity of others at stake, but also brought into play a whole definition 
of ‘normality’ and what was abnormal. Or, to paraphrase Canguilhem’s statement that ‘in 
order to discern what is normal or pathological for the body itself, one must look beyond 
the body’36: in order to understand the differentiation between ‘the child’ and ‘the idiot’, one 
must look beyond body and mind. Whereas in former times many children and adults were 
simply considered as fitting into the social fabric of daily life completely ‘naturally’, now all of 
a sudden the question arose of how and why they or others deviated from a certain standard. 
Though observations and examinations of body and mind may be more or less objective, 
Canguilhem noted that ‘it does not seem possible that we can speak with any correct logic 
of “objective pathology”’. Even if a physician or psychiatrist carries out impartial clinical 
research, the object of examination – in this case the ‘idiotic child’ – cannot be conceived 
of and constructed without being related to a positive or negative qualification.37
In setting out to analyse data included in the files of these vulnerable children – files 
compiled with the aim of establishing their status as ‘idiots’ in order to take them into 
custody – I felt the need to find a theoretical approach that could account for the ambiva-
lences and ambiguities mentioned above. In my search for an appropriate theoretical and 
methodological perspective, I was inspired by the work of Annemarie Mol and Geertje 
Mak, who apply what they term a ‘praxeographic approach’. The basic idea of this approach 
was developed by Mol in the context of her medical research in a book entitled The Body 
Multiple.38 Aiming at the development of a ‘medical ontology’, Mol’s central argument is 
that something like ‘the body’ never ‘is’ in a straightforward way. Bodies exist as ‘multiple’, 
34Patrick Mcdonagh, Idiocy: A Cultural History (Liverpool: Liverpool university Press, 2008), 5. there exists a considerable 
body of knowledge on the social construction of idiocy. see for example James W. trent, Inventing the Feeble Mind: A 
History of Mental Retardation in the United States (Berkeley: university of california Press, 1995); david Wright and anne 
digby, eds., From Idiocy to Mental Deficiency: Historical Perspectives on People with Learning Disabilities (London and 
new york: routledge, 1996); Mark Jackson, The Borderland of Imbecility: Medicine, Society and the Fabrication of the 
Feeble Mind in Late Victorian and Edwardian England (Manchester and new york: Manchester university Press, 2000).
35Mcdonagh, Idiocy, 9.
36canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, 118.
37ibid., 138.
38 Mol, The Body Multiple.
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and always in and through various so-called ‘enactments’ within specific (medical) tech-
niques and routines. Something like ‘truth’ or ‘true knowledge’ about ‘the body’ can only 
exist because it is produced in and through specific procedures and practices. Only by 
examining these practices in their logics and functioning (praxeography) can we perceive 
and know what sort of knowledge functions as ‘truth’ about the body in specific social and 
power relations. Consequently, bodies never exist only in one way; they are inherently 
‘multiple’, bringing the variety of experiences and observations involved in body-knowledge 
to the foreground. Reciprocal relations between the subject who performs a diagnosis and 
the subject – in fact ‘the object’ – who is diagnosed mediate the process of establishing a 
final ‘truth’ about bodies and their status as healthy or sick. These mediations, according 
to Mol, make ‘doing’ central and imply that ‘knowledge is not understood as a matter of 
reference, but as one of manipulation’. The guiding question no longer is ‘“how to find the 
truth?” but “how are objects handled in practice?”’.39 Therefore, as Mol notes, the plot of 
the philosophical tale is: ‘that ontology is not given in the order of things, but that, instead, 
ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-
to-day, sociomaterial practices’.40 Consequently, examining individuals in dimensions of 
body and mind connected to ‘being an idiot’ implies the search for ‘ontologies’ practised 
through specific procedures that came to be used to approach the way of being of these 
individuals. For Mol the way to approach the human condition of the patient is grounded 
in what she terms ‘an ethnographic interest in knowledge practices’.41 So, according to Mol, 
‘an ethnographer/praxiographer out to investigate diseases never isolates these from the 
practices in which they are, what one may call, enacted’.42
Geertje Mak, in her book Doubting Sex,43 provides a good illustration of how this per-
spective can be applied as a methodology for historical research.44 She examined nine-
teenth-century hermaphrodite case histories by ‘thinking through and explaining the logics 
behind practices involved in doubting sex’.45 The case histories can be considered as reports 
on the process of doubting the ‘normality’ of individuals. Mak not only contextualised her 
case histories as embedded in specific medical, social and historical discourses on sexual 
identities and abnormalities, but also studied her historical data as the outcomes of prac-
tical interventions. Or, in Mak’s own words: ‘A praxeographic approach therefore entailed 
a focus on the reported practicalities and technicalities of physical examinations, an anal-
ysis of what kinds of sex resulted from these practices, and the chronological ordering of 
that type of information’.46 Here Mak followed Mol in her ethnographic approach towards 
medical interventions by examining the ‘sociomaterial’ aspects of the historical practices 
that ‘doubted sex’. Thus, the question of ‘truth’ in the case of doubting sex became what Mol 
39ibid., 5.
40ibid., 6. Emphasis in the original.
41ibid., 5. Emphasis in the original.
42ibid., 33. Emphasis in the original.
43Mak, Doubting Sex.
44in Mol’s The Body Multiple the praxiographic approach is effectuated through an ‘ethnographical’ view on the various 
‘doings’ of doctors and patients in the clinical setting. see the chapter ‘doing disease’, 1–27.
45Mak, Doubting Sex, 15.
46ibid., 9.
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indicated as ‘a story about practices’.47 According to Mol, the crux of the analysis lies in the 
fact that ‘technicalities themselves … depend on social matters: practicalities, contingencies, 
power plays, traditions’.48 Mak’s examination of the case stories of hermaphrodites reveals 
how specific practices of ‘doubting sex’ embodied specific historical logics: the logic of 
‘inscription’ as a process of social location during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth 
century, which transformed into a more ‘bodily’ logic, reflecting the drive to disclose the 
physical aspects of the individual’s condition in the second half of the century. Finally, at 
the turn of the century a new logic came into being, which Mak refers to as a search for 
‘truth of self ’.49
In line with this praxeographic approach, my search in examining ‘idiocy’ is for the spe-
cific logic which inspired and structured the legal and medical procedures that identified a 
child, in terms of body and mind, as ‘an idiot’. When I first analysed the data in the files of 
Van Koetsveld’s first 187 pupils, I concentrated on reporting the data in terms of evidence 
concerning their social and medical background. I then related these findings to the back-
ground of how ‘idiocy’ was perceived in the historical context of the day. The concluding 
section of the previous article was entitled ‘Mental Boundaries and Educability’ and ana-
lysed the characterisation of this group of rather diverse children, who seemed vulnerable 
in several respects. In the context of a changing culture that was gradually becoming more 
industrial and meritocratic, intellectual disabilities – and the conviction that something 
could be done to limit or even eliminate these disabilities – constituted an important frame 
of interpretation. This led me to conclude that ‘the medico-pedagogical selection resulted 
in a choice for those children who had possibilities for some form of mental development’.
Although this conclusion was entirely supported by the analysis of a cultural and 
historical shift from ‘cure’ to ‘care and education’ in the treatment of children with idiocy, 
the following sentence in my former analysis reveals the underlying restrictions of this 
analysis. I continued: ‘They were not so severely mentally or physically handicapped that 
there was no prospect at all for some improvement of their condition. The selection pro-
cess, however, lacked an objective way of judging the child’s condition prior to treatment 
and success could not be guaranteed at all.’50 Instead of examining the logic behind the 
procedure of medico-pedagogical selection as a procedure, this implied the existence of 
an entirely more ‘objective’, and therefore more ‘true’ approach of distinguishing children 
with intellectual disabilities from those without. The historiography on the introduction of 
IQ tests in the Netherlands after the turn of the century, however, demonstrates the doubts 
that remained about this more ‘objective’ procedure of establishing children’s intellectual 
capacities.51 Even today, the procedures have not yet succeeded in solving the problem of 
which vulnerable children should and which should not be included in special education 
schools and specialised residential institutions.
This makes it more relevant, in contemporary and historical research, to study the logics 
that shaped the practices and procedures by which vulnerable children were assessed for 
placement in specific regimes of care, cure and education; this is indeed the focus of the 
47Mol, The Body Multiple, 54.
48ibid., 171.
49Logics show overlap in time, since they can coexist, though in competition with one another. see Mak, Doubting Sex, 225–32.
50van drenth, ‘Mental Boundaries and Medico-Pedagogical selection’, 117.
51see, for the dutch context on the development of iQ-testing, E. Mulder and f. Heyting, ‘the dutch curve: the introduction 
of intelligence testing in the netherlands, 1908–1940’, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 34 (1998): 349–66.
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praxeographic approach. In the remainder of this article I will re-examine my initial findings 
from this new perspective. What is crucial in this renewed analysis is that the data in the 
files of children admitted to Van Koetsveld’s asylum at the School for Idiots were based on 
a procedure of (medical) ‘truth-finding’ in the context of a court of law. These data were 
provided by doctors, mainly local practitioners, yet shaped by the procedure of a ques-
tionnaire which highlighted specific characteristics of a child with the express purpose of 
officially designating the child ‘an idiot’. Precisely this opened the route into confinement in 
an asylum, followed by special treatment of the child through a ‘cure by education’. Attaching 
the label of ‘idiocy’ to these children’s bodies and minds marked them as different from the 
standard, ‘the normal child’, and legitimised the relegation of the child to a sphere outside 
the world of parents and family. In reconsidering the data, my aim is to decipher the logic 
in and behind the process of authorising a child’s placement in an institution. What indica-
tions were considered guidelines for detecting ‘abnormality’ in childhood? Or, to put it in 
terms of a praxeographic methodology: how were specific issues formulated and implied 
in the instrument of the questionnaire in order to present arguments for a legal procedure 
by which a judge could assure the child’s status as a ‘true idiot’?
Children with ‘idiocy’52
When we consider the 187 cases of children accommodated in Van Koetsveld’s institution 
in the period 1857–1873, we can note some specifics of the population. First, more boys 
than girls were included, particularly in the early years. In the Annual Report of 1859 it was 
stated that well-off families, especially, showed reservations concerning the internment of 
girls in a facility for ‘idiots’. Second, most children were aged between six and 13 when they 
entered the School for Idiots. Most of them came from Protestant families, which is not 
very surprising considering Van Koetsveld’s own religious background.53 Only a minority 
of case files provide information on the social status of the family, based on the profession 
of the father; the range runs from lawyer, factory owner and clergyman to various sorts 
of unskilled labour. In about half of the cases, the court order names both parents as the 
legal representatives of the child. A quarter of the cases refer to only one parent, while in 
the remaining cases a more distant relative or non-relative is cited as the child’s guardian.
Since the School for Idiots was intended for the care of children who lacked the mental 
capacity to participate in regular education, this was the prime indication of the ‘idiocy’ 
in these children. The first section of the questionnaire in particular concerns the child’s 
development, and his or her mental and cognitive capacities. The terms used in these obser-
vations are on the one hand the child’s ‘sensitivity to regular education’ and on the other 
hand the child’s ‘character’. Not surprisingly, most of the 187 children under examination are 
claimed to be ‘not suitable for regular education’. The evidence, however, was based on the 
fact that their only educational experience was in nursery school. Consequently, only a small 
minority of the children were capable of reading and writing, and most of them only very 
poorly. As far as their ‘character’ is concerned, the majority of the children are described as 
problematic in some way or another: we find adjectives such as ‘angry’, ‘stubborn’, ‘inclined to 
52in this section i follow results reported in van drenth, ‘Mental boundaries and Medico-Pedagogical selection’ without 
further references. about 15% of the questionnaires lacked information on one or more of the topics under examination.
53some 20% of the children came from catholic families and some 5% had Jewish origins (on the basis of the approximately 
two-thirds of the files in which the religious background is stated).
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bother others’, ‘disobedient’ or ‘short-tempered’. In the last instance, however, only one child 
is described as ‘malignant’; most others are referred as ‘good-natured’ or ‘mild-mannered’.
 A separate section in the questionnaire demonstrates a medical scope in making enquir-
ies about the physical condition of the children and describing the issues that marked their 
medical history. The medical gaze typical for this part of the questionnaire details a wide 
variety of ‘symptoms’ in these children, varying from neurological problems and disorders 
of the muscular system to all sorts of health problems common among young children in 
general in those days. Although phrenology was not a very popular approach in the Dutch 
medical world,54 malformations of the skull and problems in the brain attract attention in 
a considerable number of cases. Other commonly cited symptoms include ‘convulsions’, 
which are thought to relate to various physical causes, but particularly to ‘epilepsy’. Yet only 
a minority of the children have an actual diagnosis of this disorder. Finally, the data from 
the questionnaire relate to various forms of paralysis, which seems to afflict a very small 
number of the children.
 In explaining the factors that have caused the special status of these children as ‘idiots’, 
several aspects are mentioned in the texts of the questionnaires, establishing both the logic 
of social inscription and that of the medical gaze. As far as the bodily logic of idiocy is con-
cerned, a hereditary factor is recognised in fewer than half the children, who are said to have 
a congenital influence in their ‘underdeveloped cognition’. We seldom find an indication 
of how low intellectual performance is related to ‘insanity’ in members of the wider family. 
However, in a minority of the cases ‘idiocy amongst close relations’ is noted. In just one 
case a physician points to ‘the form of the skull’ as a factor that may explain the child’s low 
mental functioning. When the physicians are explicitly asked about the actual cause of the 
‘idiocy’, they often mention physical disorders such as convulsions, problems with the spine, 
encephalitis, tuberculosis, epilepsy and forms of paralysis. In addition to physical causes 
of idiocy, the physicians sometimes mention conditions among parents that are related to 
their social position. Examples include poor conditions for mothers during pregnancy and 
childbirth and alcohol abuse by the father, which is thought to harm both the family and 
children’s lives in infancy and beyond. Generally, the social inscription logic is visible in a 
judgement regarding ‘immoral’ social behaviour of parents and relevant others.
The final section of the questionnaire focuses on the social behaviour of the child, and 
more particularly the child’s ability to adapt to new situations. The importance of this infor-
mation lies in the fact that children were to be accommodated in an institution where they 
would live among other children. Moreover, the children would be cared for by individuals 
other than their parents, and the aim was to enrol them in an educational system. The data 
show that just a small group of children are believed to have behavioural problems that 
would negatively influence their relations with other children and caregivers. Nevertheless, 
this category does include children with ‘nasty habits’ such as head-banging, biting and 
slobbering, improper sexual behaviour, not being toilet-trained, and more general ‘dirtiness’. 
Most children, however, are said to ‘like company’ and to be sociable. At the same time 
behavioural problems are seen as more or less inevitable. In other words, the status of ‘idiot’ 
inscribed on these children implicitly makes them ‘children with problems’, thus invoking 
acceptance for a certain level of disturbing social behaviour.
54Evi Loncke, ‘frenologie in België en nederland in de negentiende eeuw’ (Master’s thesis, Leuven university, Belgium, 2000–2001, 
http://www.ethesis.net/frenologie/frenologie_inhoud.htm).
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The ‘truth’ about idiocy 
If we consider these data in their entirety, they may be seen as an illustration of the first attempts 
in the Netherlands to develop the concept of ‘idiocy’ in terms of dimensions that could be used 
to determine legitimately whether the individual was of that ‘kind’.55 What is important here 
is that the intervention which had become necessary (in the perspective of individuals such as 
the Reverend Van Koetsveld) inherently entailed social recognition of a phenomenon such as 
‘idiocy’. A praxeographic approach to the cases of 187 children admitted to the asylum at his 
School for Idiots provides insight into the procedure by which relevant others enabled a court 
to reach a decision on the identity of children as ‘idiots’. In the questionnaires in which the 
children are the central objects of concern, local physicians and others formulated parameters 
for the assessment of these children as ‘true idiots’. In the process of constructing this ‘truth’ 
a medical gaze prevailed. If we analyse the legal procedures for placing vulnerable children 
in an asylum as ‘idiots’, it may become clear how, as De Swaan posits, a social transformation 
is shaped and reflected in and through ‘a vocabulary and a conceptual system’ which allows 
individuals ‘to verbalize their difficulties and thus to experience them in a specific manner’.56 
Parents and legal guardians who entrusted their children to the care of educationists and doc-
tors as professionals – individuals who ‘truly knew’ their vulnerable children – were absorbed 
into a discourse on ‘idiocy’ as a disorder and an abnormality. The procedure necessary to 
include children in a medical institution such as Van Koetsveld’s asylum provided the vocab-
ulary to voice specific experiences and problems, for which parents and doctors started to be 
willing to create new solutions. In this sense the praxeographic method enables us to analyse 
how, in terms of Mol’s ethnography, new categories, understandings and practicalities were 
formed and shaped. These legitimised the outplacement of children in an institution where 
they were treated through a ‘cure by education’. No longer were all parents seen as the prime 
daily guardians of their children who would guarantee a normal trajectory into adulthood.
The conclusions from my analysis are twofold. First, the mid-nineteenth-century Dutch 
society underwent a transformation that also affected the relationship between parents and 
children. Important developments in this context are the moral treatment movement in 
psychiatry and the increasing power of education that went hand in hand with this Dutch 
enlightenment. The gradual transformation of Dutch society under the influence of industri-
alisation, and the infrastructural works that accompanied this process, opened up new hori-
zons, stimulated cultural exchange, and enhanced the urge for development and education. 
Even individuals and children with reduced mental and physical capacities were included 
in this transformation. The designation of ‘idiocy’ as the truth about the status of vulnerable 
children such as Alida opened the route for similar vulnerable children to be accommodated 
in Van Koetsveld’s School for Idiots. This occurred in a specific socio-political context, in 
which various factors acted in coalition. On the one hand the religiously structured social 
regime was eager to educate all children in order to guide them on their way to becoming 
hardworking and devoted adults.57 On the other hand the social system increasingly protected 
55ian Hacking, ‘Kinds of People: Moving targets’, Proceedings of the British Academy 151 (2007): 285–318.
56abram de swaan, The Management of Normality: Critical Essays in Health and Welfare (London and new york: routledge, 
1990), 139.
57though the process of industrialisation was slow in the netherlands, in the 1850s and 1860s over 75% of children received 
some form of primary education. P. th. f. M. Boekholt and E. P. de Booy, Geschiedenis van de school in Nederland vanaf 
de middeleeuwen tot aan de huidige tijd (assen and Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1987), 118. see also Jeroen J. H. dekker, 
Educational Ambitions in History: Childhood and Education in an expanding Educational Space from the Seventeenth 
to the Twentieth Century (frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010).
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the legal rights of individuals who were put in confinement. Both aspects demonstrate the 
rising importance of a more caring approach towards vulnerable individuals. Moreover, chil-
dren were also considered to be ‘subjects in development’. Idiocy seemed almost their ‘natural’ 
state: ‘un-socialised’ and ‘non-educated’. This animal-like state was alluded to in narratives on 
the so-called ‘wild child’, a new icon in literature and public life since the Enlightenment.58 
Although Van Koetsveld’s project was characterised by social segregation, both in the selec-
tion of children and the organisation of daily routines within the institution, the status of 
‘true idiot’ was not reserved for children from a specific social stratum. Both well-off and 
less well-off parents could be convinced to accommodate their ‘child with a problem’ in the 
asylum. Since the aim of the School for Idiots was to educate those children, on the basis of 
the premise that education would awaken their ‘will’, this nuanced the social predisposition 
of low educability in relation to low social status. Intellectual development was no longer 
guaranteed by family background, but was seen as dependent on and restricted by the mental 
and cognitive capacities of the individual child. Even children of well-educated parents could 
lack the basic mental capacities necessary to achieve ‘normality’ and educational success.
My second conclusion concerns the procedure involved: a questionnaire in which the 
observation of children – and also of their families in terms of heredity and morality – 
allowed for a gradual process of opening up the inner world of the child. As Foucault 
indicates in his analysis of how the ‘idiotic child’ became a child in need of development, 
the lines of detecting idiocy as a ‘truth’ in these children show the dimension in which they 
were regarded as incapable of participating in regular education, yet suitable for ‘cure by 
education’. No longer were children such as Alida simply seen as ‘mad’. Instead of pathol-
ogy, educational potential was recognised. In order to stimulate the development of these 
children, the obstacles within their inner world had to be located and removed. This would 
liberate their ‘will’, enhance their capacity to experience the world more consciously, and 
enable them to develop a mind of their own. Thus, the notion of childhood in relation to 
‘idiocy’ gained importance in terms of the detection of how to distinguish illness and insan-
ity from ‘normal’ development. Interventions, both in the form of a questionnaire estab-
lishing the ‘truth’ about the child being ‘an idiot’, and in the form of the rules, procedures 
and practicalities that governed life within the asylum and School for Idiots, formed and 
shaped the lives and experiences of these children and their parents. Instead of telling about 
the actual experiences of these children and their parents, the praxeographic approach to 
the data that resulted from the questionnaire generates more insight into changing power 
relations. The modus of care and education gradually took over the traditional medical and 
psychiatric dispositive with its strong focus on pathology of body and mind.
The ‘truth’ about idiocy that resulted from the procedure of legal regulation of the admis-
sion of the first 187 children to the asylum of the School for Idiots was influential in the 
process of opening up the inner world of specific categories of children. They had become 
the object of public concern and social interest. Together with a more general interest in the 
sensorial basis of the learning process in schools, doctors and teachers alike were convinced 
that understanding mental development in a child would provide the key to educational 
intervention. In this way they also set out to improve the social functioning of children 
with idiocy and possibly even open a route for them into regular education. Any knowledge 
concerning the inner world of these children – their individuality – was considered valuable, 
58adriana s. Benzaquèn, Encounters with Wild Children: Temptation and Disappointment in the Study of Human Nature 
(Montreal etc.: McGill-Queen’s university Press, 2006); shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child, 185–89.
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though the understanding was still strongly medically dominated. The first analysis of what 
could be ‘wrong’ with children as ‘subjects in development’ thus came from doctors and 
educationists, fascinated by the unfolding psyche within the child. They understood the 
development of a ‘normal’ child, including the child’s self-awareness and mental capacities 
– the child’s individuality – first and foremost in terms of ‘will’. This will was thought to 
result from sensorial experiences in contact with the outside world, both material and social. 
But this will was also seen as a necessary condition for further development. Children who 
lacked ‘a will of their own’, and were thus hindered in their development, were regarded as 
‘abnormal’. They were considered ‘backward’, though potentially capable of developing their 
inner world if they could be stimulated to awaken from their state of ‘mental dullness’.59
In the light of Annemarie Mol’s ‘plot of the philosophical tale’, we may conclude that the 
study of ‘how ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in com-
mon, day-to-day, sociomaterial practices’ actually sharpened our historical insight into what 
can and cannot be concluded from the data in the files of the children in Van Koetsveld’s asy-
lum in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The individual children admitted to the 
asylum of the School for Idiots in The Hague in the 1850s and the succeeding decades were 
undoubtedly much more diverse than the common denominator of ‘idiocy’ might suggest. 
A praxeographic approach to the data generated by a legal procedure intended to protect 
vulnerable children reveals the logic behind the process of inscribing characteristics on 
these children that defined them as ‘idiots’. The label was primarily a requirement for them 
to be officially taken into care. Once admitted to the asylum, the children became objects 
of closer observation and examination. Their inner world was opened up for examination 
as well as for social intervention. What this meant for their personal experience – and that 
of their parents – is difficult to decide. It would take more than a century before the ‘logic 
of self ’ became a new and increasingly important state of being, which paved the way for 
more voice and visibility of children once seen as ‘true idiots’.
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